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Abstract  
Scholars suggest that in high fertility settings where there is high wanted fertility, lowering 
the desired family size is a necessary precondition for fertility declines. Though 
accumulated evidence has linked socio-economic developments to changes in fertility 
desires, little efforts have taken to disentangle the relative importance of key socio-
economic determinants such as education, income, and area of residence in a multi-level 
context. Combining individual and community-level data from Demographic and Health 
Surveys of 34 African countries to aggregate level indicators, we have quantified and 
compared the relative role of female education on fertility desire at the individual, 
community, and country levels. Results show that at the individual level, female education 
has a stronger effect compared to household wealth, and area of residence. The high levels 
of reported desired family size in the rural parts of SSA are mainly a consequence of their 
relatively lower levels of educational attainment compared to their urban counterparts. At 
the community level, the relative impact of female education is even more striking. The 
simulation results revealed that moving the most economically disadvantaged and illiterate 
woman from a low educated to a high-educated community would reduce her desired 
family size by about 20 percent. On the other hand, lifting the same woman from the poorest 
to the wealthiest community would reduce her family size desire only by 6 percent. Our 
findings are robust to alternative measures of fertility preferences. This study, thus, 
confirmed the findings of previous studies that have looked at the relationship and causal 
link between actual fertility and women’s level of educational attainment. 
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The Relative Importance of Female Education on Fertility 
Desires in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Multi-Level Analysis 
 
Endale Kebede 
 
1. Introduction 
The secular decline in fertility that has been taking place in many parts of the world is one 
of the defining events shaping the demographic and socio-economic landscape of our times. 
Following the end of World War II, Asia and Latin America underwent a remarkably fast 
fertility transition that had taken the European pioneers in this process more than a century. 
Fertility declines in these regions were possible due to initially high unwanted fertility and 
gradually lower desired family size, facilitated by the availability of birth control methods 
and other family planning services (Feyisetan and Casterline 2000; Casterline 2009). In 
contrast, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) showed little to no sign of fertility decline until the 
1980s, and the ongoing fertility declines are happening at much slower pace – sometimes 
even with stalls – compared to other regions (Bongaarts 2008; Kebede et al. 2019; Ezeh et al. 
2009). More puzzling even, fertility in the region has remained high despite the availability 
of birth control and other family planning services, as well as substantial improvements in 
child mortality. 
The reasons brought forward for this so-called “African exceptionalism” (Bongaarts and 
Casterline 2013) are manifold. Sustained high fertility could be associated with the high 
pro-natalist attitudes prevalent in the region (Caldwell and Caldwell 1990). Vast empirical 
evidence confirms that differences in fertility preferences can explain much of the variation 
in fertility across countries (Pritchett 1994; Hirschman 1994; Bryant 2007). Pritchett (1994, p. 
39) concludes that “a [A] low level of desired fertility appears to be both necessary and 
sufficient for low fertility. […] In contrast, an improvement in contraceptive access (as 
distinguished from contraceptive use) is neither sufficient nor necessary for large fertility 
reductions”. Despite the recent emergence of a change in mentality towards the adoption 
of family limitation in a number of African countries, the desired number of children at any 
given level of fertility in SSA is considerably higher than in other developing regions 
(Casterline and Agyei-Mensah 2017; Bongaarts 2017). Comparisons between the last two 
consecutive most recent DHS reveal that on average the ideal number of children in SSA 
has only declined by 0.1 child (from 5.02 to 4.92 children per woman). More strikingly even, 
in contrast to the experience of other developing regions where people had already started 
to desire smaller family sizes at the onset of the fertility transition, in SSA we observe a very 
modest excess (actual vs. desired) fertility at this stage. As indicated by the blue line in 
Figure 1, the realized fertility in the region is close to the desired fertility, and in a number 
of countries, the ideal family size is even higher than the actual.  
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Figure 1: Mean ideal number of children vs TFR in 34 SSA countries for childless women  
 
Source: Most recent DHSs. 
 
This leaves little room for the reduction of actual fertility through the elimination of 
unwanted births using voluntary family planning services and opens up the question of 
why people in SSA continue to desire that many children. Despite the strong connection 
between desired family size and later realization, SSA’s fertility desires have so far not 
received enough attention. According to classical demographic transition theory, high 
fertility results from the desire for large family sizes in response to socio-economic 
demands, rather than a failure to achieve desired smaller family sizes (Notestein 1945b; 
Easterlin 1975; Schultz 2001). By increasing the direct, as well as the opportunity cost of 
children, changes in socio-economic settings can erode the economic basis for high fertility 
desires. According to Bongaarts (2017), differences in the pace of fertility decline between 
Africa and other developing regions can be explained to a large extent through the slow 
pace of socio-economic development.  
In the ongoing debate about persistent high fertility in SSA, the present study aims to 
disentangle the relative effects of different socio-economic factors on fertility desires. More 
specifically, we are interested in the relative contribution of education compared to wealth 
and area of residence. Since the importance of different socio-economic factors can vary by 
level of spatial aggregation and higher-level effects can mask combined individual-level 
effects or an independent effect at the national level, we apply a multi-level framework to 
differentiate effects on fertility preferences at the individual, the community and the 
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country level using data from 34 SSA countries. This type of analysis is particularly 
promising in SSA, where fertility continues to be well above four children per woman in 
the majority of the countries, and more than one-third of women aged 20-39 have no formal 
education (Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital 2018). The 
results of this study, thus, will help to understand the link between education and fertility, 
as well as to reassess the gains from future investments in education. 
 
Education and Fertility Desires 
Since the pioneering work of Cochrane (1979), various micro-level studies have emphasized 
the importance, particularly of female education, in explaining fertility decline (Castro 
Martin 1995; Kravdal 2002; Bongaarts 2010). Education is generally associated with lower 
desired family size (Cleland 2002; Behrman 2015), but due to a strong economic paradigm 
in fertility research, the role of education is typically seen in conjunction with changes in 
income and other development indicators. In line with predictions from the neoclassical 
economic models of fertility, increases in women’s education negatively affect fertility 
preferences by increasing their forgone income (Becker 1981). Similarly, unified growth 
theory explains that industrialization expands not only urbanization and income but also 
the incentive to accumulate human capital which subsequently leads to fertility decline 
(Galor 2011). This conflation of education with other development indicators becomes most 
obvious in the construction of the Human Development Index (HDI) which lumps 
indicators of human capital (mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more 
and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age) together with per capita 
gross national income and life expectancy. Yet, recognizing and determining the 
importance of human capital relative to other driving forces of development has important 
policy implications, particularly in achieving the sustainable development goals (Lutz 
2017), which is why we want to look at them separately.  
Female education has also been shown to affect fertility desires through a number of 
non-economic pathways, such as increased knowledge and changing attitudes around 
fertility regulation (Cochrane 1979; Cleland and Wilson 1987), promotion of new norms 
(Caldwell 1976; 1980), social interactions (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996), enhanced female 
autonomy (Jejeebhoy 1995), and improved child health (Pamuk et al. 2011). These pathways 
can be complex and several studies have found the effects of female education on the 
desired number of children to be context-dependent, varying across regions (Jejeebhoy 
1995; Castro Martin 1995; Günther and Harttgen 2016; Casterline and Agyei-Mensah 2017), 
countries (Muhoza, Broekhuis, and Hooimeijer 2014; Behrman 2015), and across 
communities within countries (Kravdal 2002). Rather than being merely a function of their 
individual socio-economic status, women’s fertility preferences are also influenced by the 
level of socio-economic development of the community and the country in which they 
reside. The desired number of children among uneducated women from poorer and mostly 
illiterate communities differs markedly from the number of children desired by women 
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who live in mostly literate and richer communities, which is why we have to account for 
these different levels in assessing the relative importance of education.  
There are many possible explanations for context-dependent effects of socio-economic 
status on the desired number of children. Firstly, individual norms and attitudes are 
acquired through social interactions, and depend on the stock of knowledge that is 
available in the vicinity, the level of urbanization, which regulates the speed at which new 
ideas circulate, as well as the economic resources at the community’s disposal. Secondly, 
individuals tend to imitate the reproductive behaviors prevalent in their community, 
simply to gain acceptance and to avoid criticism from others (Kravdal 2002). This effect is 
particularly strong in societies without developed welfare states, where informal support 
networks act as the main form of insurance, making individuals conform more heavily to 
values and attitudes shared by the community (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987). In addition 
to these community level effects, socio-economic developments might affect individual 
fertility preferences from the national level. Overall educational attainment, for example, 
influences fertility-related content, as well as the image of women in society more broadly 
that is communicated through the mass media. Socioeconomic development affects support 
for family planning efforts and national reproductive health campaigns aiming at 
improving health-related infrastructures while reducing the relative importance of child 
labor.  
To this date and to the best of our knowledge, no single study on SSA has systematically 
and simultaneously assessed the role of education relative to other socio-economic 
indicators at these three levels (individual, community and country) in determining fertility 
intentions. Kravdal (2002) showed the independent effect of individual and community 
level education on actual fertility in 22 SSA countries. However, the study did not look at 
intentions, and since detailed information on household wealth was not yet available in 
DHS before 2003 could only disentangle the effect of education from area of residency. 
Hence, mediating factors that are possibly affected by female education, such as household 
wealth, were disregarded. Moreover, by looking at women’s ideal number of children at 
the three levels, we are able to study one (if not the most) important determinant of actual 
fertility. 
The examination of fertility desires according to individual’s education, household’s 
wealth quintile and area of residence for the 34 SSA countries included in the present 
analysis reveals a pattern consistent with the above arguments (see Figure 2). The mean 
ideal number of children declines with improvements in socio-economic status (education, 
wealth) and is lower in urban compared to rural settings. Despite possible issues of 
collinearity between the three indicators, women’s educational status appears to be the 
strongest predictor of the mean ideal number of children. Secondly, fertility desires and 
socio-economic status vary substantially across countries within SSA. The dispersion is 
particularly strong among poor, uneducated, rural women compared to their wealthy, 
better-educated, urban counterparts.  
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Figure 2: Mean ideal number of children by socio-economic status of women in 34 SSA 
 
Source: Most recent DHSs. 
 
Fertility Preferences: Definitions and Measurement Issues 
There is some variation in the terms used to denote fertility desires or ideal family size and 
the corresponding questions included in surveys. For this reason, we have to be careful in 
being clear about the terminology we use and the advantages and disadvantages of 
different ways of measuring fertility preferences. We will also have to be careful of how to 
deal with non-numeric responses to questions about fertility preferences and the possible 
preference round numbers, such as stating 10 children instead of 9 or 11. 
As mentioned, the present study uses ideal number of children as a measure of women’s 
intentions among a plethora of indicators (Thomson 2015). Desired family size is usually 
defined as the number of children a respondent would like to have based on his/her own 
assessment of the costs and benefits of childbearing, and “if there were no subjective or 
economic problems involved in regulating fertility” (Easterlin 1975, p. 82). It was first 
consistently and internationally measured by the World Fertility surveys (Lightbourne 
1985). Later, DHS employed a range of questions to collect detailed information on fertility 
desires, and construct multiple indicators of family size preferences. These indicators have 
been used to measure unmet need for family planning, to assess reproductive norms, and 
to forecast future courses of actual fertility. The first type of questions asks respondents 
about their fertility preferences prospectively. For parents, the question is; “Do you like to 
have another child, or would you prefer not to have any more children?” Related questions are 
also asked about the desired waiting time, for those who want an additional child. In 
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addition, the surveys include questions about the wantedness of recent births or 
pregnancies. 
  
DHS also provide more direct indicators of family size preferences based on the ideal 
number of children assessed retrospectively, using the following question; “If you could go 
back to the time you did not have any children and could choose exactly the number of children to 
have in your whole life, how many would that be?" For childless respondents, this question 
measures desires prospectively: "If you could choose exactly the number of children to have in 
your whole life, how many would that be?“. The ideal number of children is the most used 
measure of fertility preference. However, this indicator has several limitations (McClelland 
1983; Casterline and El-Zeini 2007; Johnson-Hanks 2007; Bongaarts 1990): 
First: Indicators of ideal family size are subject to a social desirability bias in which 
responses may only reflect the overall ideal family size of the society (Livi Bacci 2001). For 
example, the two-child family, one boy and one girl- has long been considered as an ideal 
family composition in many western European countries. On the other hand, in many SSA 
countries, large household size is generally considered as a societal ideal.  
 
Second: Individual plans may change over the life course following changes in 
economic, social, health, and other period conditions (Iacovou and Tavares 2011; Hayford 
2009; Freedman, Coombs, and Bumpass 1965). Experiences associated with changes in 
educational attainment, child survival, career trajectories, gender composition preferences, 
as well as partner’s influence may contribute to changes in desired family size (Bongaarts 
1990; Bankole & Westoff, 1998; Morgan and Rackin 2010). Namboodiri (1983) explained that 
each birth experience provides new information that could change family size desires and 
expectations. Hence, fertility intentions should be examined at different parities 
(Yamaguchi and Ferguson 1995).  
Third: Rationalization or ‘post facto revision of family size preferences’ that lead 
respondents to adjust their ideal number of children to their actual number of living 
children. In our sample of 34 SSA countries, 75 percent of women (aged 45-49) reported an 
ideal number of children higher than the number of living children, and about 8 percent of 
sampled women stated the same number of children for both indicators.  
Fourth: Women’s fertility intentions and expectations are heavily influenced by the 
fertility preferences of their husbands and/or households. Many empirical studies present 
women’s fertility desires as the main indicator of fertility norms and decisions, based on 
the presumption that women are the primary childbearers, and their desire and intentions 
determine the subsequent fertility. However, partners’ diverging desired family size is the 
primary source of differences between women’s fertility desires and expectation (Thomson 
1997; Miller and Pasta 1996). A study in Nigeria has shown that when a husband and a wife 
disagree on the desire for an additional child, the preference of both is equally important in 
the actual occurrence of the next birth (Akinrinola Bankole 1995). However, survey results 
in which both men and women were interviewed revealed that women’s and men’s 
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respective fertility desires are more similar than different (Testa 2006; Rutstein and Rojas 
2006).  
Fifth: Number heaping. In high fertility settings, women who provide numeric answers 
to questions of ideal family size may not be able to state it precisely. They instead tend to 
round numbers, such as reporting 10 children instead of 9 or 11 (see Appendix Figure A.3). 
In countries such as Chad and Niger, the vast majority of women state 10 as an ideal number 
of children. Even in countries where the mean ideal number of children is smaller, there is 
a tendency for the large majority of women stating four, five, or six children as ideal. These 
may reveal the social desirability bias in DHS. 
Despite these limitations and measurement issues, with some practical remedies in data 
analysis, indicators of women’s fertility desires could provide a quantitative base for 
assessing overall fertility norms and demands in the population. For example, sampling 
young women, and analyzing the ideal number of children controlling for parity as is 
implemented in the present study can minimize biases associated with rationalization. 
Moreover, several studies have shown strong connection between women’s fertility desire 
and achieved fertility (Günther and Harttgen 2016; Pritchett and Summers 1994). 
Furthermore, Van de Kaa (2001) explained that fertility preference indicators should play a 
causal role in theories of fertility decline. 
 
Non-Numeric Responses 
In DHS, a small but significant proportion of responding women do not numerically 
answer to questions about ideal family size, but provide instead non-numerical responses, 
such as 'it is up to God', 'as many as possible' or 'I do not know'. Appendix Table A.2 
presents the proportion of women who provide non-numeric responses to the question of 
ideal family size in 34 SSA countries by survey year. It shows that in earlier surveys, a 
substantial proportion of women provided non-numeric responses. For example, in the first 
surveys of Nigeria (1990) and Burkina Faso (1993), about 60 percent and 25 percent, 
respectively, of women provided non-numerical responses. In recent surveys, however, the 
share of non-numeric responses significantly declined. In Burkina Faso’s 2010 DHS, only 
3.5 percent of women provided non-numeric answers.  
Though many researchers have taken such kind of responses as missing values, studies 
have shown that non-numeric responses are meaningful in understanding fertility 
transition theories (Frye and Bachan 2017; Hayford and Agadjanian 2011). In relation to A. 
J. Coale (1973) precondition that lasting fertility decline happens when childbearing is 
“within the calculus of conscious choice", demographers often associate non-numeric 
responses to 'pre-transitional mindset' that women lack deliberate control over their 
fertility. On the other hand, a decline in non-numeric responses to ideal family size are 
precursors of the onset of fertility transitions (Caldwell 1976; Van de Walle 1992). Appendix 
Figure A.1 shows the prevalence of non-numeric responses by the mean ideal number of 
children across SSA countries. It reveals that non-numeric responses are more prevalent in 
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pre/early-transitional context in countries where the mean ideal number of children (and 
thus TFR) is higher.  
Moreover, research has shown that the 'up to God" or 'I do not know' responses to ideal 
family size question may reflect socio-economic characteristics of respondents-such as 
educational attainment- as well as uncertainty stemming from high child mortality (Riley, 
Hermalin, and Rosero-Bixby 1993; Sandberg 2005). A study in Malawi has shown that 
better-educated women tend to answer numerically, and report smaller ideal family size 
(Yeatman 2009). Appendix Figure A.2 displays the average proportion of non-numeric 
responses in SSA by individual socio-economic status, in most recent surveys. The non-
numeric responses are generally higher among non-educated, poor, and rural women. The 
average proportion of non-numeric respondents among women with no formal education 
is about six percent, while it is below two percent among those with completed secondary 
education or more. 
Due to its association with predictors of family size preferences, excluding non-numeric 
responses from our sample data could cause a severe bias. However, as shown in Appendix 
Table A.2 and Appendix Figure A.2, the proportion of women providing non-numeric 
responses to fertility preferences in SSA is declining over time, and the correlation between 
non-numeric responses and key predictors of fertility preference is not substantial. Thus, 
the bias associated with non-numeric responses could be minimized by employing only the 
most recent DHS data, which is the approach used in this paper.  
 
2. Data  
This study is primarily based on DHS data from 34 SSA countries. Within each country, the 
survey made use of a two-stage cluster sampling technique and standardized 
questionnaires to collect comparable, reliable and nationally representative data on 
population health, living conditions and demographic characteristics of households. The 
data set pools information about 432,083 women (see Table 1). For reasons mentioned 
above, only most recent surveys are considered.  
DHS provides multiple indicators of women’s preferences regarding family size 
(discussed in the previous section). The present study uses the most direct and easiest to 
interpret indicator, namely the ideal number of children. In all 34 countries, women were 
asked: “If you could go back to the time you didn’t have any children and could choose exactly the 
number of children to have in your whole life, how many would that be?” To minimize 
measurement limitations and the associated biases of this indicator, our sample is limited 
to the most recent surveys, and the analysis were conducted parity-wise. 
DHS reports educational status of each member of the selected household including that 
of women of reproductive age (15-49) and of the head of the family. To examine the effect 
of individual education on fertility desires, five levels of female educational attainment 
were created from individual files: no formal education, incomplete primary education, 
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completed primary education, some secondary education, and completed secondary 
education or more. While recognizing the possible independent effect of community level 
education, we derive the mean years of schooling (MYS) of women for each sample cluster. 
To test whether less educated women could be affected by the reproductive behavior of 
potentially influential women (including better-educated ones) in the community, we 
created a categorical variable dividing the distribution of cluster-specific MYS 
approximately into thirds. Less than 3.2 MYS is categorized as “low”, more than 3.2, but 
less than 6.2 years as “medium”, and 6.2 or more years as “high”. To assess the impact of 
country-level education, we include the logged proportion of working-age population 
(aged 20-64, both sexes combined) with lower secondary education or more (Wittgenstein 
Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital 2018). 
The impact of household economic resources on women’s fertility desires is examined 
using the household’s wealth quintile. This categorical variable is constructed using 
information on assets and the availability of important services within a household, such 
as water supply, electricity, radio and type of flooring. At the community level, a categorical 
indicator of relative wealth (poor, medium, rich) is constructed from the mean of wealth 
quintile scores for all households within the cluster. The impact of economic resources at 
the national level is assessed using a country’s per capita gross domestic product (PPP 2011 
international $) around the time of the survey. These data are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators database (World Bank 2017) and are included into our analysis as 
a continuous variable, transformed by taking the natural logarithm.  
In addition, in our multi-level analysis we control for the impact of area of residence as 
it is defined and reported in DHS (urban vs rural). Similarly, we control for region-specific 
differences in fertility desires within SSA by including dummy variables for Central and 
Western (reference level), Eastern and Southern Africa.  
Another major factor associated with lower fertility desires is availability and use of 
family planning services. By increasing people’s capacity to control their fertility, family 
planning helps people to reduce the number of unwanted births (Coale 1973). Information 
on the intensity of family planning activities at the national level are available through the 
Family Planning Effort Index (FPEI, Kuang and Brodsky 2016). The FPEI was intended to 
measure the strength and weakness of national family planning efforts in four main 
dimensions: policy context, service provision, monitoring and evaluation, and access to 
fertility control methods. The index was constructed based on the assessment of 10-15 
experts from government, the private sector, academia, non-governmental organizations 
and international agencies of each country and is available periodically for the period 1972-
2014 for a large number of countries. The national experts rated 36 items of their country’s 
family planning programs on a scale from one (no effort) to 10. The FPEI was then 
calculated by taking the average of the 36 ratings as a percentage of the maximum possible 
score. 
While the FPEI takes account of the input side of family planning, the output side (e.g. 
actual use of modern contraceptives) are excluded from our analysis for two main reasons. 
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First: Contraceptive use to some extent is a consequence of fertility preferences, not an 
explanatory factor. The desire for smaller families creates a demand for family planning 
services and keeping all other factors constant, women with lower desired family size are 
more likely to use contraceptives than those with high fertility preferences. Second: 
Women’s contraceptive use is linked to their socio-economic status. Hence, including 
contraceptive use in the analysis would underestimate the total effect of the antecedent 
background factors such as education and economic resources. Moreover, the study aims 
to compare the effects of the demand side determinants of fertility preferences setting aside 
the supply side factors.  
Descriptive country-specific sample statistics including the number of clusters, the 
number of women sampled, as well as the country level socio-economic indicators included 
in the analysis are provided in Table 1. Variation in the mean ideal number of children 
across SSA countries is substantial. While in Swaziland it is as low as 2.5, it reaches 8.6 
children in Niger. Likewise, considerable heterogeneity is observed with respect to socio-
economic development. GDP per capita, for example, is as low as 682 $ in Burundi, while 
in Gabon it is 17,000 $. The proportion of working age adults with at least lower secondary 
education ranges from a low of 4.7 percent in Niger to a high of 71 percent in South Africa. 
The proportion of urban population reaches a high of 80 percent in Gabon but only 11 
percent in Burundi. Unlike the other socio-economic indicators, the FPEI index shows 
smaller variation between sample countries: at 49.8, the FPEI for Niger, the country with 
the highest ideal number of children, is not very different from the family planning effort 
index at the other end of the spectrum (52 for Swaziland).  
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Table 1: Number of women, clusters, and selected country-level socio-economic 
characteristics for 34 SSA countries 
Country Survey  
Year 
# 
Women 
# 
clusters 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(PPP -
2011 $) 
% adult 
(20-64) 
with lower 
secondary 
or more  
% 
urban 
pop. 
Family 
planning 
effort 
index 
Mean 
ideal 
number 
of 
children 
Angola 2015-16 14,377 622 6955 12.7 40.9 . 4.72 
Burkina Faso 2010 13,591 573 1350 11.6 23 45.6 5.07 
Benin 2017-18 16,526 553 1931 17.1 41.2 57.2 4.32 
Burundi 2016-17 16,909 554 682 8.2 11.2 55.6 3.75 
DR Congo 2013-14 14,326 536 760 43.3 40 40.2 5.95 
Cameroon 2011 13,550 577 2574 34.1 50.1 38.6 5.27 
Chad 2015 4,740 622 2073 10.3 22.1 45.5 7.76 
Comoros 2012 10,149 252 1396 32.8 27.9 . 5.15 
Congo 2011 9,218 384 5595 37.6 62.2 38.0 4.61 
Cote d'Ivoire 2011 3,955 351 2726 19.1 48.7 43.4 5.12 
Ethiopia 2016 13,928 638 1529 10.3 18.2 58.9 4.16 
Gabon 2012 7,911 330 17100 39.9 85 . 4.49 
Gambia 2013 9,899 281 1570 25.6 55.7 46.5 6.00 
Ghana 2014 9,233 425 3833 53.8 50.7 53.8 4.03 
Guinea 2012 8,145 300 1183 38 39.1 4.6 5.58 
Kenya 2014 14,243 1,573 2747 54.2 23.6 49.4 3.39 
Lesotho 2014 6,608 397 2672 27 24.8 42.2 2.53 
Liberia 2013 8,817 322 770 28.4 47.5 45.6 4.53 
Madagascar 2009 16,330 593 1528 14.3 29.4 47.3 4.33 
Malawi 2015 24,234 850 1114 34.2 15.7 47.6 3.65 
Mali 2012 10,107 413 1862 9.8 34.7 50.9 5.54 
Mozambique 2011 13,604 610 913 16.7 30.5 43.0 4.46 
Namibia 2013 9,053 522 8858 45.1 40.8 51.2 3.30 
Niger 2012 10,201 475 807 4.7 17.3 49.8 8.56 
Nigeria 2013 36,154 896 5309 37.3 42.8 40.7 6.21 
Rwanda 2014 13,362 491 1516 11.3 24 73.5 3.15 
Sierra Leone 2013 15,864 434 1570 21.2 38 41.1 4.67 
South Africa 2016 8,485 595 12393 71.2 54.5 60.8 2.87 
Swaziland 2006-07 4,947 265 7141 39.5 22.3 52.3 2.45 
Tanzania 2015 12,631 606 2421 14.8 28.8 46.6 4.56 
Togo 2013-14 9,217 330 1280 18.1 37.2 50.3 4.00 
Uganda 2016 18,033 695 1738 19.2 15.1 50.9 4.44 
Zambia 2013 15,858 720 3488 40.9 38.4 43.9 4.32 
Zimbabwe 2015 19,878 399 1709 68 33 58.7 3.81 
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3. Method 
In order to assess the relative impact of education on fertility desires, we employ multi-
level Poisson regression models accounting for the hierarchical nature of our data. Failure 
to control for the correlation resulting from the characteristics shared by women within the 
same neighborhood and neighborhoods within the same country can mask underlying 
unobserved heterogeneity and lead to biased estimates. Because of the small number of 
observations at the household level, we settle for a more parsimonious three-level model 
where women (level 1) are nested within clusters (level 2), which are again nested within 
34 SSA countries (level 3). The base model is specified in the following way: 
log(Y𝑁𝑖,k,𝑐,𝑡) = α +  𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖,𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑋
𝑎
𝑖,𝑘,𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝑋𝑏𝑖,𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 + U𝐾 + 𝑈𝑐   − − − − − − − − − (1) 
where individual 𝑖 is nested in cluster 𝑘 and clusters are grouped within country 𝑐. The 
subscript 𝑡 represent the survey year, which varies among sample countries (see Table 1). 
Since the response to fertility ideals heavily depend on the number of children a woman 
already has (rationalization), the above equation was estimated separately for different sub-
samples of women at different parity levels, 𝑁 = 0,1 − 2, 3 − 4 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥ 4. The outcome 
variable Y𝑖,𝑘,𝑐 measures the ideal number of children.  The error terms U𝐾 and 𝑈𝑐 capture 
cluster- and country-specific deviation from the conditional mean (the intercept), 
respectively. They are assumed to be normally distributed with constant variance. We 
control for age of woman at the time of the survey ( 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑐), as well as individual-level 
educational status (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖,𝑘,𝑐), household wealth quintile (𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑘,𝑐), and place of residence 
(𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑘,𝑐). Moreover, we implement controls at the community-level (𝑋
𝑎
𝑖,𝑘,𝑐,𝑡), and at the 
country-level ( 𝑋𝑏𝑖,𝑘,𝑐,𝑡): mean years of schooling among the community’s women of 
reproductive age, mean wealth quintile score, the country’s proportion of adult population 
with at least lower secondary education, log GDP per capita, family planning effort index 
and other geographical indicators. We develop eight models to test the relative impact of 
our indicators at multiple level on the desired number of children as shown below.  
 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports the multi-level model estimates that compare the relative importance of 
education and economic resources, at the individual, community and the country-level, on 
fertility desire of women with no children at the time of the survey. The same specification 
were estimated for women with 1-2, 3-4 and 4+ children (results are presented in appendix 
table A.3). Model 1 of Table 2 show the bi-variate effect of selected individual, community 
and country level variables on the desired number of children, adjusting only for age of 
women. Older women tend to report higher desired number of children. Both individual 
education and household economic resources show a strong and statistically significant 
relationship with fertility desire. The desired number of children is estimated to decrease 
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with women’s level of education. Relative to those with no education, the rate ratio dropped 
by 10 percent for those with some primary education, by 16 percent for those with 
completed primary education, by 22 percent for those with incomplete secondary 
education, and by about one-third for those with at least completed secondary education. 
Similar to education, the effect of household economic resources shows a negative bi-
variate association with the desired number of children, with women from higher wealth 
quintiles desiring less children. However, the difference in the desired number of children 
between the lowest and highest wealth quintile is smaller than the difference between 
having no education and having at least completed secondary education. Compared to 
women from the poorest households (q1), fertility desires among those from the middle 
wealth quintile (q3) are about 10 percent lower and about 25 percent lower among women 
from the wealthiest households (q5).  
Model 2 focuses on the simultaneous adjustment of effect of education at the individual, 
community- and country-level, controlling for age. Increased education continues to be 
associated with a strong, statistically significant drop in fertility desires at all levels. 
However, the adjusted effects are weaker than the unadjusted bi-variate effects presented 
in Model 1. The estimated effect for the proportion of adults (20-64) with at least a lower 
secondary education at the country-level has weakened substantially and become 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the country-level effect of education no longer 
plays a significant role once individual- and community-level effects have been controlled 
for. Similarly, in Model 3, the estimated coefficients of the effects of increased economic 
resources at all levels turn out to be much lower than in the bi-variate case (Model 1). 
However, the effect of wealth continues to be statistically significant and of considerable 
size at all three levels. The unexplained country and community-level variations are higher 
in the model where only economic resources are controlled for (Model 3) than in the model 
where only education variables are included (Model 2), indicating that education has more 
explanatory power by itself.  
Finally, Model 4 controls for both education and economic resources at all levels 
simultaneously. Most notably, this leads to a reduction in the importance of economic 
resources at all levels, while the effects of education prove to be relatively robust to the 
inclusion of wealth. At the individual level, the effect of increased wealth remains 
statistically significant, but effect sizes are small: relative to women from the poorest wealth 
quintile, women in the fourth, and fifth quintile are estimated to have only 5-8 percent lower 
desired fertility. At the community-level, desired fertility for women from richest 
neighborhoods is estimated to be only 8 percent lower compared to women from relatively 
poorest neighborhoods, while the difference in the odds ratios for the richest and medium 
wealth neighborhoods is no longer statistically significant. Similarly, at the country level, 
the effect of GDP per capita appears substantially weakened.  
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On the other hand, the effect of female education remains strong and statically 
significant. The incidence rate for women with at least completed primary education is 15 
percent lower than for those with no formal education. More strikingly even, at the 
community-level women from the most educated communities are estimated to report an 
18 percent lower desired number of children compared to women from the least educated 
communities. The effect of the country-level education variable remains statistically 
insignificant. Results for the median rate ratio reported at the bottom of the table indicate a 
fairly higher level of unobserved heterogeneity at the country-level rather than at the 
community-level. This suggests that unobserved or unmeasured factors at the country level 
that are affecting women’s fertility desires have a stronger impact compared to those at the 
community level . 
Figure 3 shows the predicted desired number of children for different combination of 
education and economic resources based on the mutually adjusted Model 4 (Table 2). Panel 
A shows the simulation of different combinations of assumptions for education on the 
individual and community level for women from the lowest wealth quintile (q1), living in 
the poorest communities of a country with per capita GDP of only $700, and only 5 percent 
of the population (20-64) have lower secondary education or more. Under these 
circumstances, increasing education at the individual-level leads to a sizable drop in the 
desired number of children. In a community where women on average have less than 3.2 
years of education, lifting a woman from no formal education to completed secondary 
education keeping all else constant would reduce her desired number of children by about 
18 percent (from 6.78 to 5.5 children per woman). In a highly educated community where 
women have more than 6.4 MYS, the same hypothetical experiment would reduce desired 
fertility from 5.62 to 4.6 children. On the other hand, the impact of acquiring economic 
resources on fertility desires of the most disadvantaged women is minimal. As displayed 
in panel B, for women with no formal education and living in poorly educated community, 
increasing household wealth, from the poorest quintile (q1) to the highest (q5) quintile 
would result in only a minor drop in the desired number of children-from about 6.78 to 
6.31. 
The simulation results reveal the relatively stronger impact of education than economic 
resources at the community level too. For example, moving a woman with no formal 
education from a low educated community to a high-educated community would reduce 
her fertility preference by about 17 percent (from 6.78 to 5.62). In contrast, panel-B showed 
that the benefit of lifting from a poorest community to the richest (mean wealth quintile 
above 3.6) would lead only to minor changes in the desired number of children: from 6.78 
to 6.34 for the poorest woman (q1) and from 6.31 to 5.9 for the richest women (q5).  
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Figure 3: Simulations of desired fertility under different education and economic resources 
scenario1 
 
 
4.1. Comparing Effect of Education and Area of Residence 
Extensive evidence from developing countries suggests that urban dwellers tend to aim for 
smaller family sizes compared to people living in rural areas (Eloundou-Enyegue and 
Giroux 2012). The main reasons are the higher financial cost of supporting a child in the 
city, the lack of available living space, the reduced demand for labor outside an agrarian 
context as well as higher exposure of urban economies to negative consequences of 
economic downturns. However, the strength of the effect of area of residence, and whether 
it is linked to differences in other socio-economic developments such as education and 
income is less clear. Consistent with previous studies, we find a strong bi-variate 
association between place of residence and fertility desires; relative to urban residents, the 
incidence rate for rural residents is about 22 percent higher. As shown in model 5 of Table 
3, this effect disappears almost entirely and becomes statistically insignificant once we  
                                                          
1 It is simulated for hypothetical a country with GDP/capita (PPP) of $700, and only 5 percent of adult 
population has secondary education. Panel-A is calculated for economically most disadvantaged 
women who lived in the poorest household (q1) and low economic resource community. Panel-B, 
on the other hand, is calculated for women with no formal education who reside in a low educated 
community.  
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control for the various effects of education. Model 6 extends model 5 by adding indicators 
of economic resources but the effect of education remains unchanged, while the coefficient 
for area of residence shows a small reduction reflecting the lower economic resources of 
rural residents compared to urban residents. High levels of reported desired fertility in the 
rural parts of SSA are thus mainly a consequence of low levels of educational attainment 
among the people that live there.  
In line with previous studies, our results presented in Model 7 confirm large variation 
in fertility desires across the larger sub-regions within SSA. Though it could partly derive 
from regional differences in socio-economic development, our multi-level results suggest 
that after controlling for education, income and rural residence, people in central and 
western African countries have higher fertility preferences compared to women from 
eastern and southern African countries: about 16 percent and 42 percent higher, 
respectively. This confirms the exceptionally high prevalence of pro-natalist attitudes 
associated with cultural norms that supported child bearing in central and western African 
countries (May 2012). The reduction in the country median rate ratio associated with the 
inclusion of sub-regional dummies also indicates the considerable impact of region-specific 
unobserved factors determining fertility desires in SSA.  
Bongaarts (2011) attributes the high levels of desired fertility in SSA to the relative 
weakness of family planning programs in the region. The supposed channels through 
which family planning efforts determined differences across countries in the speed of 
fertility decline could correlate with education. Therefore, in Model 8 (Table 3) we further 
control for country-level variation in the intensity of family planning efforts. However, the 
effect of family planning efforts as measured by the FPE index turns out to be small and 
insignificant, while the effects of education, at both individual and the community-levels 
remains strong and unchanged. On the other hand, the inclusion of family planning reduces 
the effect of per capita GDP. 
 
4.2. Sensitivity Analysis: Measurement Issues 
As described earlier, the ideal number of children is not an ideal indicator of fertility 
preferences. DHS provides information on a number of alternative measures, such as 
women’s desire to have another child; the length of time a woman would like to wait before 
having another child (in case she already had one); and whether the most recent birth has 
been wanted or not. Casterline and El-Zeini (2007) suggest that ‘desire for another child’ is 
indeed the most valid and reliable indicator of fertility preferences. The related question 
posed to women in DHS reads: “Would you like to have another child, or would you prefer not to 
have any more children?” Although answers to this question do not provide a quantitative 
measure of the intensity of women’s fertility desires, tabulating them by parity can give an 
insight into women’s desires to stop childbearing once a target number has been achieved 
in the spirit of ‘family limitation’ mentalities (Casterline and Agyei-Mensah 2017).  
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Thus, in order to see if our results hold with an alternative indicator of fertility 
preferences, we re-specify our original model (equation 1) using desire for another child as 
the dependent variable. Since the desire to have another child will heavily depend on the 
number of children a woman already has, we estimate this new specification described by 
equation 2 separately for different sub-samples of women at different parity levels 𝑁. This 
also helps avoid the potential bias induced through ex-post rationalization in the case of 
ideal number of children.  
 
logit(Y𝑁,𝑖,k,𝑐) = α +   𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑐 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖,𝑘,𝑐 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑘,𝑐 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑘,𝑐 + 𝑋
𝑎
𝑖,𝑘,𝑐
+ 𝑋𝑏𝑖,𝑘,𝑐 + 𝜇𝑘 + 𝜇𝑐 − − − − − − − − − − − −(2) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝜇𝑘 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2); 𝜇𝑐 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2); 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛  𝑁 = 1,2,3,4  
The outcome variable Y𝑁,𝑖,k,𝑐 measures whether a woman 𝑖 with 𝑁 surviving children 
wants an additional child or not. The explanatory variable  𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑐 divides women into 
categorical 5-year age groups depending on their age at the time of the survey, whereas 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖,𝑘,𝑐 stands for individual educational status, 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑘,𝑐 is the household wealth 
quantile, and 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑘,𝑐 controls for a woman’s area of residence (urban/rural). The 
community- and country-level controls remain unchanged. 
 
Figure 4: Estimated odds ratios (and 95 percent confidence intervals) for the likelihood of 
wanting additional child by parity associated with increasing women’s education and 
household wealth, for women aged 15-49 in 34 SSA countries 
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Appendix Table A4 reports the estimated odds ratios and the associated 95 percent 
confidence intervals for the likelihood of wanting another child by women’s parity level 
from the logistic regressions specified in equation 2. Consistent with the multi-level Poisson 
model results, the importance of area of residence in predicting fertility desires remains low 
in the logistic regression: Disregarding the number of living children, the odds of wanting 
another child for rural residents are not significantly different from those of their urban 
counterparts. At the country-level, though insignificant, the proportion of adult population 
with lower secondary education or more is negatively associated with women’s desire for 
an additional child at all parity levels, whereas per capita GDP is negatively associated with 
the desire to stop childbearing.  
Figure 4 compares the effect of increasing female education and household wealth on 
fertility preferences for women with two, three and four living children estimated in three 
separate model runs. Irrespective of parity, the odds of wanting another child drop 
significantly with increasing education and the impact of female education is estimated to 
be higher at higher parties. Relative to those women with no formal education, the 
likelihood of wanting another child by women with completed secondary education or 
more is lower by 17 percent at parity two, by 34 percent at parity three, and by 43 percent 
at parity four. The larger drop in the odds of wanting another child for women with higher 
educational status could reflect a stronger ‘family limitation’ mentality among better-
educated groups of women. Household wealth quintiles, on the other hand, do not appear 
to be related to desires to have another child in any statistically significant way. 
Disregarding parity, the preference for an additional child among women from the lowest 
wealth quintile score (q1) is not significantly different from the preferences of women in the 
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highest wealth quintile (q5). These results confirm our conclusions drawn from the Poisson 
models where female education is found to be a stronger predictor of ideal number of 
children than household wealth. 
 
Figure 5: Estimated odds ratios (and 95 percent confidence intervals) for the likelihood of 
wanting additional child by parity associated with increasing Community MYS and 
community wealth quantile scores, for women aged 15-49 in 34 SSA countries  
 
The relative effect of community education vs. community wealth quantile score is also 
examined in Figure 5. For women with only two living children, the odds of wanting 
another child by those residing in the least educated communities is about 20 percent higher 
than those from a community where the MYS of women of reproductive age is between 3.2 
and 6.4 years, and about 35 percent higher than those from highly educated communities 
(MYS>6.4 years). Moreover, the drop in the odds associated with each higher level of 
community-level education markedly increase with parity, suggesting less desire for 
further children within better educated communities. Similarly, the odds of wanting 
another child substantially drop with the community mean wealth quantile score at each 
parity. However, the decline in the odds ratio with higher level of community wealth does 
not get stronger with the number of living children 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion  
The originality of this research lies in its analysis of the relative effect of education and 
economic resources on women’s fertility desires at individual, community, and country 
level. Using DHS data for 34 SSA countries, we show that both individual and community 
levels of education have a significant dampening impact on woman’s fertility desires. In 
this, it confirms the findings of Kravdal (2002) and Colleran & Snopkowski (2018) that are 
showing similar results in relation to actual fertility. Comparing the relative effect of 
education and economic resources, we found that education at all levels has a stronger 
effect compared to economic wealth, while the effect of both is statistically significant at 
individual and community level. However, when we include both variables at all levels in 
a model, the importance of economic resources is reduced, not so much at the individual 
level, but at the more aggregate level, i.e. community level. At the same time, the effect of 
education proves to be relatively robust, also when we control for place of residence and 
when we test other measures of fertility intentions based on parity. In fact, this result is not 
surprising and summarized plenty of literature that has looked at the relationship and 
causal link between fertility and women’s level of educational attainment (Bongaarts 2010, 
Jejeebhoy 1995, Gustafsson 2001, Kravdal 2002).  
On the other hand, why education is more influential in determining fertility intentions 
than other contextual parameters such as wealth and place of residence has not been very 
much researched in the SSA context. Several studies have shown that the association 
between wealth and fertility (realization in most cases) differs significantly by settings, but 
is usually positive at very high levels of fertility (Colleran and Snopkowski 2018; Skirbekk 
2008). From an evolutionary perspective, it has been shown that the abundance of resources 
lead to an increase in output, also in terms of fertility, within small-scaled, pre-transition 
economies (Kaplan 1996). However, this would mean that high-income countries would 
experience the highest fertility of all, which is not the case. Obviously, there is a turning 
point when the effect size of wealth on fertility becomes negative. On this aspect, it is 
interesting to turn back to the wealth flows theory of (Caldwell 1976) on intergenerational 
transfers that postulates that in pre-transitional primitive traditional societies, the net flows 
of resources are from children to parents and thereafter in transitional societies the flows 
reverse, from parents to children, therefore leading to investments in the children 
accompanied by a more limited number of off-springs per family. This theory has been 
widely disputed, for instance criticizing the measurement of flows of (Kaplan 1994). 
Caldwell stresses the factors affecting the demand for children that are the results of social 
changes that concentrate greater family concern on the children. This theory that stresses 
the factors affecting the demand for children is very close to the early work on the 
demographic transition of (Notestein 1945), who hypothesized that social and economic 
development would bring fertility down by changing parents’ aspirations and the role of 
children.  
In a transitional society, at which stage are most of the SSA countries in our sample, the 
spread of mass education will influence culture, norms and modes of behavior. In this 
setting, the existence of substantial group differences in fertility intentions can be expected 
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since those segments of the population most exposed to new ideas, by reason of their 
education or geographical location, will form the vanguard of change, while others less 
exposed to education will most likely pursue more traditional fertility patterns. In that 
sense, the importance of wealth can have a mixed effect that could be one explanatory factor 
between the lack of correlation with fertility intentions and realization.  
What we have demonstrated also here is that education at the community level has an 
effect on a woman’s fertility intentions above and beyond that of her own education, 
paraphrasing Kravdal 2002. There again the predominant effect of community education 
relatively to community wealth and place of residence could be explained by the “spill-
over” from other people’s education that so that for instance uneducated women living in 
an educated society could pursue a different fertility career compared to uneducated 
women living in an uneducated society. It could also mean that neighboring populations 
are more homogenous in terms of wealth than they are in terms of education especially in 
transitional societies, or that the mixed effects observed at the individual level accumulate 
at the community level and provide less clear reproductive cues than education would.  
From a policy point of view, the fact that education is more determinant for the reduction 
of fertility intentions is rather good news because education is usually a state direct 
investment and wealth more of an outcome from different elements, directly or indirectly 
or not at all influence by state policy.  
Education as a dominant factor affecting desired fertility in SSA, and in turn, the actual 
fertility has clear implications: Changes in women’s level of education on the sub-continent 
will be important to accelerate the fertility transition. The speed of these changes will 
strongly influence population growth in the mid- to long-term. While the momentum of 
population growth guarantees further large increase at least until the middle of the century, 
the sub-continent could show very different fertility feature thereafter depending on the 
educational investments that will be made. 
This article has some limitations that are in part inherent to the data that we are using. 
The indicator chosen to evaluate family planning services in each country, i.e. FPE index 
does not show much variation across countries and was mainly chosen because of the lack 
of other supply indicators for all sample countries. A second limitation is that we are using 
cross-sectional data and cannot infer the causal relation between a change in any of the 
independent variables and the desired number of children. We have limited the number of 
variables as not to complicate the analysis but as a result may have occulted some variables 
that could be of importance such as women’s labor force participation and level of 
autonomy, the survival of infant and children. This could be the input for further work, that 
could also look at how the relationship will evolve in the African context as those countries 
move slowly to the later stage of the demographic transition.  
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Appendix 
Appendix Table A.1. Variable definition and data sources 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
Age Age of woman at the time of the survey in five 
years interval(15-19,20-24,…..45-49) 
DHS 
Women’s education highest years of schooling: No formal education, 
incomplete primary, completed primary, 
incomplete secondary, and completed secondary or 
more 
DHS 
Household Wealth Wealth quantile score of the household (q1,q2,…q5) DHS 
Area of residence Area of residence(urban or rural) of sampled 
woman 
DHS 
Community 
education 
Mean years of schooling of reproductive age 
women with in the cluster: low (<=3.2(low), more 
than 3.2, but less than 6.2 years (medium), and 
>=6(high) 
DHS 
Community wealth Categorical indicator of relative wealth (poor, 
medium, rich) of the community is constructed 
from the mean of wealth quintile scores for all 
households within the cluster 
DHS 
Country education Percent of adult(20-64) population with lower 
secondary education or more(natural log) 
WIC 
National Income GDP per capita(PPP 2011 $)(natural log) WB/WDI(2017) 
FPEI Family planning effort score(natural log) Kuang and 
Brodsky (2016) 
Sub-region Regional location of the country: Central and 
western Africa, Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa 
United Nations 
2017 WPP 
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Appendix Figure A.1.: Proportion of women providing non-numeric responses to ideal 
family size questions vs mean ideal number of children from the most recent DHS of 34 
SSA countries 
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Appendix Table A.2: Percentage of women providing a non-numeric response to question 
of ideal family size by survey phase in 34 SSA countries 
 Country DHS-I DHS-II DHS-III DHS-IV DHS-V DHS-VI DHS-VII 
Angola - - - - - -  
Burkina Faso - 24.8 20.9 5 - 3.5 - 
Benin - - 4.9 10.2 7.2 0.2 - 
Burundi 10.1 - - - - 5 2.2 
DR Congo - - - - - 6.1 - 
Cameroon - 9.8 15 14.5 - 7 - 
Chad - - 2.2 12.1 - 23 - 
Comoros - - 7 - - 10.5 - 
Congo - - - - 11.6 4.2 - 
Cote d'Ivoire - - 2.4 - - 7.1 - 
Ethiopia - - - 18 10.4 10.6 10.7 
Gabon - - - 9.7 - 4.7 - 
Gambia - - - - - 2.9 - 
Ghana 12.8 - 7.3 7.2 1.6 - 1.7 
Guinea - - - 4.1 10.4 11 - 
Kenya 5.3 - 5.7 5.3 3.2 - 1 
Lesotho - - - 0.3 - 0.2 0.2 
Liberia 24.4 - - - 6.3 4.2 - 
Madagascar - 6.5 4.7 9 5.9 - - 
Malawi - 13.2 - 3.4 - 2.1 1.3 
Mali 25.1 - 10.5 24.4 17.1 3.1 - 
Mozambique - - 14.8 1.6 - 0.9 - 
Namibia - 8.1 - 4.1 0.9 1.2 - 
Niger - 13.8 23.8 - 15.3 7.4 - 
Nigeria - 60.8 - 10.6 13.2 7.3 - 
Rwanda - 1.3 - 3.1 3.7 1.1 0.9 
Sierra Leone - - - - 5.4 4.9 - 
South Africa - - 0.7 - - - - 
Swaziland - - - - 0.7 - - 
Tanzania - 13.5 7.9 1.8 1.9 - 4 
Togo 0.4 - 8.4 - - 2.6 - 
Uganda 8.5 - 6.6 4.3 3.6 2.7 2.4 
Zambia - 6 2.4 - 6.4 6 - 
Zimbabwe 7.3 - 0.7 - 1.2 0.9 0.3 
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Appendix Figure A.2: Proportion of women providing non-numeric responses to ideal 
family size questions by socio-economic status, from the most recent DHS of 34 SSA 
countries 
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